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OPINION 
________________________ 
 
STARK, Chief District Judge.    
 In this antitrust case, suppliers of processed egg 
products are accused of conspiring to reduce the supply of eggs 
and, consequently, increasing the market price for egg 
products.  The District Court, relying on our decision in Mid-
West Paper Products Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 
573 (3d Cir. 1979), as well as the bar on indirect purchaser 
actions established in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 
(1977), concluded that the purchaser-plaintiffs lack antitrust 
standing.  We find that neither Mid-West Paper nor Illinois 
Brick bars the price-fixing claims asserted here and reverse the 
District Court’s grant of summary judgment. 
I 
This is a case about eggs.  After collection from laying 
hens, most commercially-produced eggs proceed through one 
of two principal distribution channels.  The first path is for 
“shell eggs,” which are supplied to grocery stores and other 
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distributors as whole eggs, packaged, for example, in crates by 
the dozen.  “‘Shell eggs’ [are] defined as eggs produced from 
caged birds that are sold in the shell for consumption or for 
breaking and further processing.”  In re Processed Egg 
Products Antitrust Litig., 312 F.R.D. 171, 177 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 
2015). 
The second path involves what are referred to as “egg 
products.”  “‘Egg products’ [are] defined as the whole or any 
part of shell eggs that have been removed from their shells and 
then processed, with or without additives, into dried, frozen, or 
liquid forms.”  Id. at 177 n.5.  Food manufacturers are the 
primary purchasers of egg products, using them as ingredients 
in goods ranging from frozen waffles to salad dressing to 
mayonnaise. 
In a series of individual and class actions brought by 
purchasers of shell eggs and egg products, certain egg suppliers 
are accused of price-fixing in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 1.  It is alleged that, between at least 1999 and 2008, 
these producers conspired to reduce the population of egg-
laying hens, resulting in a reduced supply of eggs and, in light 
of the inelasticity of demand in the relevant markets, 
supracompetitive prices.1 
                                                 
1 “Demand for a product is inelastic if the price can rise without 
a corresponding drop in demand.”  A.D. Bedell Wholesale Co. 
v. Philip Morris Inc., 263 F.3d 239, 246 (3d Cir. 2001).  As 
applied here, if “the demand for eggs is highly inelastic,” as 
Appellants contend, then “a relatively small reduction in the 
egg supply results in a large increase in egg prices.”  (Opening 
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Appellee United Egg Producers, Inc. (“UEP”), a trade 
association, allegedly played an important role by coordinating 
a certification program.  Egg producers participating in the 
certification program were required to increase their hens’ cage 
sizes and refrain from replacing hens that died with another 
laying hen (a practice known as “backfilling”).  It is alleged 
that the animal welfare rationale offered for these practices is 
merely a pretext for the true goal of reducing egg supply to 
drive up egg prices. 
Appellants – Kraft Foods Global, Inc., Kellogg 
Company, General Mills, Inc., and Nestlé USA, Inc. 
(hereinafter, “Plaintiffs” or “Purchasers”) – are food 
manufacturers.  They sued Appellees – UEP, as well as an 
exporting entity under UEP’s control (United States Egg 
Marketers, Inc. (“USEM”)), and five processed egg product 
suppliers2 who made sales directly to the Plaintiffs – in the U.S. 
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.  The Judicial 
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred the case to the U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 
consolidating it for pretrial purposes with other cases involving 
similar antitrust claims (the “MDL”). 
                                                 
Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants (“OB”) at 15) 
 
2 The five supplier Appellees are Rose Acre Farms, Inc., Ohio 
Fresh Eggs, LLC, Michael Foods, Inc. (“Michael Foods”), 
R.W. Sauder, Inc., and Cal-Maine Foods, Inc. (hereinafter 
referred to, together with UEP and USEM, as “Defendants” or 
“Suppliers”). 
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Plaintiffs’ claims are based solely on purchases of egg 
products; claims by purchasers of shell eggs are being litigated 
in other cases within the MDL.  Plaintiffs seek to recover 
overcharges they paid in the market for egg products due to 
“substantially increased” prices resulting from Defendants’ 
alleged participation in the supply-reduction conspiracy.  (OB 
at 10) 
More particularly, the Purchasers’ theory is that the 
Suppliers conspired to reduce the supply of shell eggs, and to 
inflate the price of shell eggs, with the intent and effect of also 
artificially inflating the price of egg products.  The Purchasers’ 
view, which they contend is supported by their expert, is that 
the relevant market consists of shell eggs and egg products.  
Therefore, according to the Purchasers, the prices they paid for 
egg products – of which shell eggs are the main input – include 
overcharges, just as the conspiring Suppliers intended.  (See 
generally JA416) (Plaintiffs’ counsel arguing during summary 
judgment hearing, “[O]ur allegations and our proof are that the 
output-reduction conspiracy at the henhouse level impacted in 
the same way both shell eggs and egg products.”)3   
                                                 
3 In this Opinion we sometimes refer to shell eggs as the price-
fixed product.  At other times we refer to shell eggs as a price-
fixed input into egg products, and describe egg products – the 
principal component of which is shell eggs – as a price-fixed 
good.  For purposes of this Opinion, these descriptions are 
interchangeable.  Plaintiffs allege, and have an expert who 
agrees, that Defendants intended to artificially inflate the prices 
of shell eggs and egg products by restricting the supply of eggs.  
(See OB at 10 (“The conspiracy was intended by defendants to 
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 The Suppliers are vertically integrated to varying 
degrees.  Thus, some proportion of the egg products purchased 
by Plaintiffs was made using eggs obtained from non-party, 
non-conspirator egg producers (“non-conspirator eggs”), with 
much or all of the remainder made from eggs sourced 
internally, from the Suppliers’ own laying hens (“internal 
eggs”).4  A slightly altered version of a diagram prepared by 
the Purchasers depicts this arrangement: 
                                                 
raise market prices for both shell eggs and egg products.”); 
JA248 (alleging that “Defendants agreed to control supply and 
artificially maintain and increase the price of eggs [i.e., all 
eggs]”); JA200 (specifying that term “‘eggs’ refers to both 
‘shell eggs’ and ‘egg products’”); JA749 (“[E]conomic theory 
and the documentary record indicate that firms that process egg 
products affect shell egg prices by seeking opportunities to 
divert eggs to the most profitable product, and vice versa. . . .  
Thus, anticompetitive actions to reduce the overall production 
of eggs will impact prices of all types of eggs analyzed in my 
report.”))  While in some cases whether the price-fixed item is 
the complete product purchased by the plaintiff, or is instead 
merely a component of that product, may be relevant, 
resolution of the issues presented here is not impacted by this 
distinction.  See generally Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 
815 (3d Cir. 1984) (“Antitrust policy requires the courts to seek 
the economic substance of an arrangement, not merely its 
form.”). 
 
4 In addition, certain Defendants obtained shell eggs from other 
conspirator-Defendants.  These eggs are within the scope of 
what this Opinion refers to as “internal” eggs, as they were 
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The dashed line in the left box indicates that internal eggs are 
used as an input for the egg products purchased by Plaintiffs-
Purchasers from Defendants-Suppliers.  In addition, as 
represented by the dotted line running from the right box into 
the left box, those same egg products also contain some amount 
of non-conspirator eggs that are first purchased by Defendants-
Suppliers from non-conspirator egg producers.  Therefore, the 
egg products Plaintiffs purchased from Defendants contain 
some combination of internal eggs, supplied directly by 
Defendants, and non-conspirator eggs, supplied indirectly by 
non-conspirator egg producers. 
                                                 
produced within the conspiracy.  For purposes of the issues 
before us, it does not matter whether a Defendant’s “internal” 
eggs came from a flock owned by that same Defendant or 
instead from a flock that belonged to a fellow conspirator-
Defendant.  
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During discovery, Plaintiffs’ damages expert opined 
that (i) the relevant market included both shell eggs and egg 
products; (ii) small reductions in flock size and egg supply 
caused significant increases in egg prices, due to the market’s 
high inelasticity of demand; and (iii) this increase also enabled 
Defendants to overcharge Plaintiffs for their purchases of egg 
products.  Plaintiffs collectively claim aggregate damages in 
excess of $111 million.   
Plaintiffs’ damages calculations make no distinction 
between overcharges for egg products made using internal 
eggs and those made from non-conspirator eggs.  Plaintiffs’ 
expert testified at his deposition that the proportion of price-
fixed egg products derived from non-conspirator eggs is 
irrelevant.  In the view of Plaintiffs’ expert, Defendants’ 
conspiracy effected an increase in the market price of all shell 
eggs, regardless of their source.  (See JA596-97) (“As 
documented . . . there are no close substitutes for eggs – 
regardless of whether one considers shell, liquid, dried, or 
frozen eggs. . . .  A reduction in egg production means that 
fewer eggs are available for making/processing shell eggs or 
egg products.”)  Consequently, and as Defendants allegedly 
intended, Plaintiffs paid an overcharge on all of the egg 
products they purchased from Defendants, even if those egg 
products were made, in whole or in part, from non-conspirator 
eggs.  (See generally JA749-50) (“[A]nticompetitive actions to 
reduce the overall production of eggs will impact prices of all 
types of eggs analyzed in my report. . . .  The primary 
mechanism through which the alleged conspiracy impacted the 
prices of shell eggs and egg products was through coordinated 
efforts to reduce national flock size and the overall number of 
eggs generally . . . .”) 
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After discovery concluded, Defendants moved for 
summary judgment.  They argued that Plaintiffs’ inclusion in 
their damages calculations of egg products made with non-
conspirator eggs violated Mid-West Paper’s prohibition on 
“umbrella damages.”  Defendants emphasized that none of 
Plaintiffs’ allegations involves any wrongdoing undertaken at 
the egg product production stage, but only concern the 
production of shell eggs at the laying stage.  They also 
demonstrated that one defendant, Michael Foods, made the 
“overwhelming majority” of relevant egg product sales, and 
that most of the egg products sold by Michael Foods were 
made with non-conspirator eggs.  (Joint Response Brief of 
Defendants-Appellees (“AB”) at 10)  In other words, it is 
undisputed that “a Michael Foods egg product most likely was 
manufactured using egg supplied by a non-conspirator.”  (Id. 
at 11) 
Defendants also pointed to Plaintiffs’ expert’s 
acknowledgment that, “as of 2004, producers not alleged to be 
defendants or conspirators accounted for more than 45% of 
[hen] flocks in the United States.”  (AB at 12) (citing JA590)  
Further, according to Defendants, Plaintiffs’ damages 
calculations do not reveal “whether the allegedly higher prices 
resulted from higher raw egg prices or higher processing 
margins.”  (AB at 14) 
 The District Court entered summary judgment for 
Defendants.  It found that Plaintiffs lack antitrust standing 
because they impermissibly seek to “link the raw egg prices of 
non-conspirators to the conspiracy” in violation of Mid-West 
Paper, and, alternatively, their allegations run afoul of Illinois 
Brick’s bar on “recovery of pass through overcharges.” (JA9-
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10)  Plaintiffs ask us to reverse the District Court’s entry of 
summary judgment and remand the case for trial. 
II 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1331 and 1337.  Plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal on 
October 4, 2016.  On October 6, 2016, we sought input from 
the parties as to whether “[t]he order appealed from . . . 
dismissed all claims as to all parties.”  In response, both sides 
agreed that, notwithstanding the pendency of other related 
cases in the MDL, the District Court’s order that is the subject 
of this appeal resolved all claims brought by Plaintiffs and, 
therefore, was a final order immediately appealable under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  We agree.  See Gelboim v. Bank of America 
Corp., 135 S. Ct. 897, 904 (2015) (“Cases consolidated for 
MDL pretrial proceedings ordinarily retain their separate 
identities, so an order disposing of one of the discrete cases in 
its entirety should qualify under § 1291 as an appealable final 
decision.”).  Therefore, we have appellate jurisdiction pursuant 
to § 1291.  
III 
We review the District Court’s order granting summary 
judgment de novo.  In doing so, we “apply the same test the 
District Court should have used.”  Howard Hess Dental Labs. 
Inc. v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 237, 246 (3d Cir. 2010).  
Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  We 
evaluate the record “in the light most favorable to the 
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nonmoving party and draw all inferences in that party’s favor.”  
Burns v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 642 F.3d 163, 170 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
IV 
Section 4 of the Clayton Act allows one “injured in his 
business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the 
antitrust laws,” such as price-fixing prohibited by the Sherman 
Act, to sue for treble damages.  15 U.S.C. § 15(a).  Plaintiffs 
contend that the District Court erred in finding that they lack 
antitrust standing and their § 4 claims are barred by Mid-West 
Paper and Illinois Brick.5  We agree. 
A 
 The term “standing” as used in the antitrust context is 
conceptually difficult and has not been delineated with 
precision.  See generally Associated Gen. Contractors of 
                                                 
5 Plaintiffs also contend that the District Court abused its 
discretion in “sua sponte rejecting [their] economic expert’s 
opinions concerning the relevant product market and the 
impact of the alleged output conspiracy on the prices that 
[Plaintiffs] paid.”  (OB at 5; see also id. at 51-56)  Any flaw in 
the District Court’s assessment of Plaintiffs’ expert’s opinions 
stemmed from the District Court’s assessment of the relevant 
case law.  On remand, it will be for the District Court to 
determine whether to permit Defendants to renew or restate a 
challenge to Plaintiffs’ expert’s opinions and to decide the 
merits of any such attack.  (See infra Section VI.C) 
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California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 
U.S. 519, 536 (1983) (“AGC”) (“There is a similarity between 
the struggle of common-law judges to articulate a precise 
definition of the concept of ‘proximate cause,’ and the struggle 
of federal judges to articulate a precise test to determine 
whether a party injured by an antitrust violation may recover 
treble damages.”).  It is also something of a misnomer.  For a 
party to have “antitrust standing,” it must do more than satisfy 
the familiar three-part test for standing – “injury in fact, 
causation, and redressability,” see generally Steel Co. v. 
Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 103 (1998) – that 
arises from the constitutional requirement of a “case or 
controversy.”  See AGC, 459 U.S. at 535 n.31.6  “The doctrine 
of antitrust standing requires a plaintiff to ‘prove more than 
injury causally linked to an illegal presence in the market.’”  In 
re Modafinil Antitrust Litig., 837 F.3d 238, 263 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(quoting Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 
U.S. 477, 489 (1977)).  Even a showing of antitrust injury – 
that is, “injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to 
prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants’ acts 
unlawful,” Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 489 – is insufficient on its 
own to show antitrust standing to sue for treble damages under 
§ 4 of the Clayton Act.  See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of 
Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 110 (1986). 
                                                 
6 There is no dispute that Plaintiffs have met their burden to 
show constitutional standing.  They allege they suffered an 
injury in fact by having to pay overcharges, which were caused 
by Defendants’ anticompetitive price-fixing, and which could 
be redressed by a Court order awarding treble damages. 
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Instead, noting the breadth of § 4, courts have concluded 
that, rather than allowing “antitrust laws to provide a remedy 
in damages for all injuries that might conceivably be traced to 
an antitrust violation,” Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Calif., 
405 U.S. 251, 262 n.14 (1972), the treble damages remedy 
should be “confine[d] . . . to those individuals whose protection 
is the fundamental purpose of the antitrust laws,” Cromar Co. 
v. Nuclear Materials & Equip. Corp., 543 F.2d 501, 505 (3d 
Cir. 1976) (internal quotation marks omitted).  There is no 
bright-line test.  Instead, the Supreme Court has identified 
factors to be considered in determining if a plaintiff is a party 
entitled (under the particular circumstances of a specific case) 
to the protections of the antitrust laws.  Based on the Supreme 
Court’s opinion in AGC, we have extracted the following five-
factor inquiry: 
(1) the causal connection between the antitrust 
violation and the harm to the plaintiff and the 
intent by the defendant to cause that harm, with 
neither factor alone conferring standing; 
(2) whether the plaintiff’s alleged injury is of the 
type for which the antitrust laws were intended 
to provide redress; 
(3) the directness of the injury, which addresses 
the concerns that liberal application of standing 
principles might produce speculative claims; 
(4) the existence of more direct victims of the 
alleged antitrust violations; and 
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(5) the potential for duplicative recovery or 
complex apportionment of damages. 
See Ethypharm S.A. France v. Abbott Labs., 707 F.3d 223, 232-
33 (3d Cir. 2013); see also Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 
Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 171 F.3d 912, 924 (3d Cir. 
1999) (characterizing AGC as setting out six-factor test). 
Therefore, determining whether Plaintiffs have antitrust 
standing to pursue their claims requires application of the AGC 
factors, based on an understanding of the most pertinent 
antitrust precedents.  It is to those opinions that we now turn.7 
B 
 The District Court’s ruling turned on our Mid-West 
Paper decision and the Supreme Court’s decision in Illinois 
Brick, and we discuss both cases in some detail below.  Other 
cases must also be considered in order to place these two 
principal cases in the proper context.  
 In Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 
392 U.S. 481 (1968), the Supreme Court considered a § 4 
action brought by a shoe maker against a manufacturer of 
machinery that the shoe maker used in its operation.  The 
manufacturer argued that the shoe maker was not injured by 
the manufacturer’s anticompetitive conduct because the shoe 
                                                 
7 Although all the cases we discuss in the next section predate 
AGC, they remain binding precedents, and their analyses of 
many of the factors later discussed in AGC are highly 
informative. 
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maker had passed on to its own customers any overcharge it 
had paid to the manufacturer.  The Supreme Court rejected this 
“passing-on defense” on the basis that overcoming it would 
impose on antitrust plaintiffs a requirement of making “a 
convincing showing of . . . virtually unascertainable figures,” 
resulting in the possibility that “those who violate the antitrust 
laws by price fixing or monopolizing would retain the fruits of 
their illegality because no one was available who would bring 
suit against them.”  Id. at 493-94.  “Treble-damage actions 
would often require additional long and complicated 
proceedings involving massive evidence and complicated 
theories,” which would unduly deter those suffering from 
antitrust injury, and embolden those inclined to commit 
antitrust violations.  Id. at 493. 
 A decade after Hanover Shoe, the Supreme Court 
decided Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. 720.  There, the State of Illinois 
and local governments claimed that concrete block 
manufacturers had engaged in a price-fixing conspiracy.  
Observing that the plaintiffs were “indirect purchasers of 
concrete block, which passes through two separate levels in the 
chain of distribution before reaching” the plaintiffs, id. at 726, 
the Supreme Court explained that Hanover Shoe’s prohibition 
on a “pass-on theory as a defense in an action by direct 
purchasers” likewise required a symmetrical ban on “offensive 
use of a pass-on theory against an alleged violator.”  Id. at 735.  
In so holding, the Court aimed to protect defendants from the 
“serious risk of multiple liability” that might result from 
allowing an unascertainably large number of disparate, indirect 
purchasers to bring antitrust claims.  Id. at 730.  Potential 
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liability would arise, instead, only from transactions 
defendants had with their direct customers.  See id. at 745-47.8 
Further, just as Hanover Shoe wanted to avoid 
burdening antitrust plaintiffs from nearly-impossible 
evidentiary challenges, Illinois Brick reflected the Supreme 
Court’s “perception of the uncertainties and difficulties in 
analyzing price and out-put decisions in the real economic 
world . . . and of the costs to the judicial system and the 
efficient enforcement of the antitrust laws of attempting to 
reconstruct those decisions in the courtroom.”  Id. at 731-732 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  The Court was concerned 
that allowing pass-on theories “would transform treble-
damages actions into massive efforts to apportion the recovery 
among all potential plaintiffs that could have absorbed part of 
the overcharge from direct purchasers to middlemen to 
ultimate consumers.”  Id. at 737. 
 This Court was called upon to apply Illinois Brick’s 
teachings in In re Sugar Industry Antitrust Litigation (Stotter 
& Co., Inc. v. Amstar Corp.), 579 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1978) 
(“Stotter”).  In Stotter, a candy wholesaler sued sugar refiners 
who allegedly conspired to fix sugar prices.  The wholesaler 
had purchased candy (made with the price-fixed sugar) directly 
from one of the sugar refiners.  The district court granted 
                                                 
8 There are exceptions to Illinois Brick’s “indirect purchaser” 
rule – for “pre-existing cost-plus contract[s]” or circumstances 
where “the direct purchaser is owned or controlled by its 
customer,” 431 U.S. at 736 & n.16 – but they are not relevant 
to the issues before us. 
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summary judgment to the refiners, finding that the wholesaler-
plaintiff had not “pleaded or proved . . . that a conspiracy to fix 
sugar prices by the major refiners extends to their own sugar-
containing products.”  Id. at 16 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  On appeal, the plaintiff argued – as the egg product 
Purchasers do here – that “if it cannot sue for the overcharge 
incorporated in candy brought about by the price-fixing of 
sugar, then no one can,” and thus the refiner from whom it 
purchased candy would “escape liability for fixing the price of 
all the sugar it incorporated into candy.”  Id. at 17. 
 Judge Weis, in an eloquent and succinct opinion, 
explained why the plaintiff did not “run into an (Illinois) brick 
wall” and could, indeed, pursue its § 4 action.  Id. at 15.  While 
it was true that the product at issue – that is, the wholesaler’s 
candy – “competes not with sugar, but with other candy, and 
more than one ingredient determines the price” of candy, this 
could not “be allowed to obscure the fact that the plaintiff did 
purchase directly from the alleged violator.”  Id. at 17.  We 
distinguished Illinois Brick on the basis that the Supreme 
Court’s concerns over complicated allocations of “overcharge 
among a number of entities in the chain” were not present.  Id. 
at 18.  “The difficulty in computation” in Stotter was “not in 
parceling out damages among entities in the chain, but in 
isolating the excessive cost of one ingredient which goes into 
the product purchased by the plaintiff.”  Id.  This was a 
tolerable level of complexity.  See id.  Judge Weis also 
explained that denying recovery under the circumstances 
presented in Stotter “would leave a gaping hole in the 
administration of the antitrust laws” by allowing “the price-
fixer of a basic commodity to escape the reach of a treble-
damage penalty simply by incorporating the tainted element 
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into another product.”  Id.  This Court, therefore, reversed the 
district court and permitted the wholesaler-plaintiff to proceed 
with its claim.9 
 Shortly after deciding Stotter, we were again tasked 
with applying Illinois Brick, this time in Mid-West Paper, 
which involved allegations of price-fixing by manufacturers of 
consumer bags.  See 596 F.2d 573.  One of the plaintiffs was a 
grocery store (“Murray”) that used consumer bags to package 
its own products.  Even though Murray purchased these bags 
from competitors of the price-fixing defendants – and not from 
the price-fixing defendants themselves – Murray argued that it 
had standing to pursue § 4 damages from the price-fixing 
defendants because it was the defendants’ actions that allowed 
Murray’s non-conspirator supplier to charge supracompetitive 
prices.  See id. at 580-81; see also id. at 578 (“[W]e are required 
to assess whether Illinois Brick bars suits by purchasers from 
competitors of the antitrust defendants who allege that 
defendants’ anticompetitive activity made it possible for their 
                                                 
9 We came to the same conclusion more recently in In re 
Linerboard Antitrust Litigation, 305 F.3d 145 (3d Cir. 2002).  
There, the putative class plaintiffs purchased “corrugated 
sheets or boxes” directly from the defendants; these products 
were made with “linerboard that was subject to an agreement 
on output.”  Id. at 159.  We held that, under Stotter, the 
plaintiffs – as direct purchasers from conspirators who had 
unlawfully raised the price of an input into finished products 
the conspirators themselves sold to plaintiffs – had antitrust 
standing.  See id at 159-60. 
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competitors to charge higher prices, thereby injuring 
plaintiffs.”). 
 We recognized that a “literal reading” of § 4’s broad 
language might support Murray’s contention.  See id. at 581.  
However, we further observed that “§ 4 standing doctrine has 
been forged so as to confine the availability of treble damages 
to those individuals whose protection is the fundamental 
purpose of the antitrust laws.”  Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  In evaluating Murray’s claim that it was harmed by 
the conspirators’ creation of an “‘umbrella’ under which their 
competitors were able to charge higher prices than otherwise,” 
we concluded that only a “tenuous line of causation” existed 
between the price-fixers’ conduct and the prices Murray 
ultimately paid.  Id. at 583.  We also observed that, because 
Murray was not a direct purchaser from the price-fixers, “[t]he 
defendants secured no illegal benefit at Murray’s expense.”  Id. 
 Additionally, as in Illinois Brick, it would have been 
difficult to trace Murray’s alleged injuries to the price-fixers’ 
conduct, or to prove that the price-fixers’ competitors would 
not have charged the elevated price for reasons other than 
defendants’ conspiracy.  Comparing Murray’s claim to Illinois 
Brick, we explained: 
[I]n both situations the plaintiff seeks to recover 
for higher prices set by, and paid by it to, parties 
other than the defendants.  And the rationale 
underlying Illinois Brick [–] that it would be 
almost impossible, and at the very least 
unwieldy, to attempt to trace the incidence of the 
anticompetitive effect of defendants’ conduct  
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[–] bears even greater truth in the context of a 
purchaser from a competitor of the defendants.  
For . . . it cannot readily be said with any degree 
of economic certitude to what extent, if indeed at 
all, purchasers from a competitor of the price-
fixers have been injured by the illegal 
overcharge. 
Id. at 584.    
 We did not want to sanction the transformation of 
antitrust litigation “into the sort of complex economic 
proceeding that the Illinois Brick Court was desirous of 
avoiding if at all possible.”  Id. at 585.  Hence, we concluded, 
Murray could not be considered among “those whose 
protection is the fundamental purpose of the antitrust laws.”  
Id. at 583 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Barring parties 
like Murray from recovering under an “umbrella theory,” from 
antitrust conspirators with whom Murray had no direct 
relationship, would not undercut the goals of “depriv[ing] the 
violators of all the fruits of their illegality” or deterring further 
wrongdoing, but would instead efficaciously “concentrat[e] the 
entire award in the hands of the direct purchasers.”  Id. at 585 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  This would give direct 
purchasers “an incentive to sue” and “compensate[] those 
victims who are most likely to assume the mantle of private 
attorneys general for the injuries they suffered.”  Id.; see also 
id. at 578 n.9 (“[T]he [Supreme] Court has ensured that under 
all circumstances there will be an incentive for direct 
purchasers to sue, a factor that, in the Court’s view, is 
necessary to promote effective enforcement of the antitrust 
laws . . . .”). 
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V 
 In this case, the District Court applied Mid-West Paper 
and Illinois Brick and concluded that Plaintiffs lack antitrust 
standing.  The District Court remarked that a significant 
proportion of the eggs used in the egg products purchased by 
Plaintiffs were non-conspirator eggs; that is, they had come 
from suppliers who were neither price-fixing conspirators nor 
defendants. 
 The District Court reiterated concerns it had raised in a 
previous ruling in a related case (also part of the MDL) 
regarding Defendants’ opposition to a class certification 
motion.  There, the Court had observed: 
‘[T]he failure to investigate the effect of the eggs 
from non-defendants on the prices of egg 
products weighs against a finding that the 
conspiracy would have had a common impact on 
the members of the putative subclass, [because] 
non-conspiring producers might price their 
products differently than conspirators, [and these 
differences might be reflected] in the prices of 
egg products, even if sold by Defendants, 
meaning that certain subclass members might 
not have experienced an impact as a result of the 
conspiracy.’ 
(JA7-8) (quoting Processed Egg, 312 F.R.D. at 202 n.22) 
 As the District Court pointed out, “Plaintiffs’ theory of 
the case is that Defendants conspired to reduce the supply of 
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eggs.  This, in turn, raised the price of eggs, and, consequently, 
the price of egg products.”  (JA9)  Given that “[a] significant 
proportion of the egg products at issue here is made with eggs 
purchased from non-conspirators,” the absence of any analysis 
by Plaintiffs of what Defendants paid for non-conspirator eggs 
and how much of Defendants’ egg products were made with 
those eggs rendered it “impossible to tell whether [or to what 
extent] the Defendants profited unduly from these egg 
products.”  (Id.)  It seemed to the District Court that, instead, 
Defendants may have had to pay the non-conspirator egg 
producers a price that could have precluded Defendants from 
“reap[ing] ill-gotten gains from the egg products sales.”  (Id.) 
 In the District Court’s view, because “Plaintiffs are 
relying on the theory that the conspiracy raised prices for all 
eggs, even those produced by non-conspirators,” their claim “is 
a quintessential restatement of the umbrella theory” rejected in 
Mid-West Paper.  (Id.)  Alternatively, but also unavailing, the 
District Court found Plaintiffs’ claims could be characterized 
as a combination of umbrella damages and a pass-on/indirect 
purchaser “problem” of Illinois Brick.  (Id.)  As the District 
Court saw it: “Attempting to link the raw egg prices of non-
conspirators to the conspiracy is, under Mid-West Paper, too 
attenuated, and recovering overcharges when the Plaintiffs 
have not presented evidence that the Defendants, and not the 
non-conspirators, pocketed those overcharges creates a 
situation in which Plaintiffs are seeking recovery of pass-
through overcharges, something prohibited by Illinois Brick.”  
(JA9-10)  Furthermore, despite Plaintiffs’ insistence that “their 
expert has isolated the effects of the conspiracy on the prices 
of egg products,” to the District Court the expert could not have 
done so “without any analysis whatsoever of the non-
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conspirator egg producers’ pricing decisions and without any 
knowledge of which eggs went into which egg products, and 
in what proportion.”  (JA10)  Accordingly, because “Plaintiffs 
are indeed at odds with the ‘umbrella’ damages rule,” the 
District Court granted summary judgment to Defendants.  
(JA4; see also JA10 n.4 (concluding Plaintiffs “cannot 
distinguish their damages theory from prohibited umbrella 
damages”)) 
VI 
A 
 We have a different view than the District Court.  While 
the District Court appropriately turned to Mid-West Paper and 
Illinois Brick as the most relevant precedents, we see this case 
as one in which the correct result is not compelled by either of 
these opinions – or, indeed, by any other.  Instead, this case 
presents an issue of first impression.  The novel issue is 
whether a direct purchaser of a product that includes a price-
fixed input has antitrust standing to pursue a claim against the 
party that sold the product to the purchaser, where the seller is 
a participant in the price-fixing conspiracy, but where the 
product also includes some amount of price-fixed input 
supplied by a third-party non-conspirator. 
 Before answering that question, we first note that 
Plaintiffs plainly have antitrust standing to seek damages for 
overcharges for egg products made only with internal eggs.  
Relatedly, Plaintiffs have antitrust standing to seek damages 
for just the portion of the egg products they purchased that 
were made from internal eggs.  These conclusions are 
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compelled by our holdings in Stotter and Linerboard.  Just as 
the Stotter defendants were accused of fixing the price of sugar, 
and then incorporating price-fixed sugar into candy they sold 
directly to the Stotter plaintiff, Defendants here allegedly 
conspired to raise the price of shell eggs (by reducing supply), 
and then incorporated their price-fixed internal eggs into the 
egg products they sold directly to Plaintiffs.  Like the plaintiff 
in Stotter, if Plaintiffs cannot sue for the overcharges they paid 
for egg products made with Defendants’ internal eggs, no one 
can.  Cf. Stotter, 579 F.2d at 18 (“[T]o deny recovery [here] . . 
. would leave a gaping hole in the administration of the antitrust 
laws . . . [by] allow[ing] the price-fixer of a basic commodity 
to escape the reach of a treble-damage penalty simply by 
incorporating the tainted element into another product.”).  
Moreover, any difficulty in computing damages arises not from 
“parceling out damages among entities in the chain, but in 
isolating the excessive cost of one ingredient.”  Id.  This is a 
challenging task, but also one we found in Stotter to be 
amenable to litigation and worthy of the efforts of federal 
courts, and we again find so here. 
 We need not belabor these points.  Defendants concede 
that, had Plaintiffs limited their claim to damages based only 
on the internal eggs used in the Defendants’ egg products, 
Plaintiffs likely would have had antitrust standing.  Plaintiffs 
have avoided limiting their claim in this manner and strongly 
prefer not to do so now.  Nor does it appear that the parties 
asked the District Court to assess the viability of an antitrust 
claim based solely on egg products made from internal eggs. 
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B 
 As the Plaintiffs have chosen to pursue a claim for 
damages on all the egg products they purchased from the 
Suppliers, without regard to whether those egg products were 
made with internal eggs, non-conspirator eggs, or both, we 
must determine whether Plaintiffs have antitrust standing with 
respect to this broader claim.  We hold that they do. 
We do not view Plaintiffs’ claim as “a quintessential 
restatement of the umbrella theory” of Mid-West Paper.  (JA9-
10)  To be sure, there are similarities between the Purchasers’ 
allegations here and those that were inadequate to create 
antitrust standing in Mid-West Paper.  The Purchasers’ claims, 
like those of Murray in Mid-West Paper, involve allegations 
that the conspiracy raised the price of a product that was 
produced both by conspirators and non-conspirators.  This 
allegedly price-fixed product found its way into the injured 
parties’ hands and, as in Mid-West Paper, the Purchasers seek 
to recover for overcharges for products whose manufacture 
involved non-conspirators.  But the pertinent similarities 
between the Purchasers’ claims and those rejected in Mid-West 
Paper end there. 
Crucially, unlike the plaintiff in Mid-West Paper, who 
sued price-fixing suppliers from whom it made no purchases 
and with whom it had no direct relationship, here the 
Purchasers are pressing claims against price-fixing suppliers 
from whom they directly purchased products that incorporate 
a price-fixed component.  While Murray, in Mid-West Paper, 
had to predicate its purported injuries on an “umbrella theory” 
– that is, that the price-fixing defendants’ wrongful conduct 
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created an artificially high price “umbrella” under which non-
conspiring producers from whom the plaintiff purchased also 
benefitted by charging higher prices – here the Purchasers’ 
theory of injury is different, and simpler.  The Purchasers are 
suing the conspiring parties from whom they bought the price-
fixed product.  The Purchasers were directly injured by 
wrongful conduct undertaken by their Suppliers. 
The direct relationship between the Purchasers and their 
Suppliers, and the fact that the Suppliers are alleged price-
fixing conspirators and not merely competitors of those 
conspirators, are key distinctions from the scenario we 
confronted in Mid-West Paper.  See In re Modafinil, 837 F.3d 
at 264-65 (“Mid-West Paper reached its result because it 
wanted to ensure that only those who are most directly harmed 
by the anticompetitive conduct can sue to remedy the antitrust 
violation.”); In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litig., 
998 F.2d 1144, 1167-68 (3d Cir. 1993) (discussing Mid-West 
Paper and noting “all-important[] directness factor”).  The 
plaintiff in Mid-West Paper was “not in a direct or immediate 
relationship to the antitrust violators,” 596 F.2d at 583, and was 
“seek[ing] to recover for higher prices set by, and paid by [it] 
to, parties other than the defendants,” id. at 584.  Here, the 
Purchasers are in a direct relationship with the antitrust 
violators and seek to recover for higher prices set by those 
violators, and paid by the Purchasers to those very parties.  
These quite different facts render the Purchasers “among those 
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whose protection is the fundamental purpose of the antitrust 
laws.”  Id. at 583 (internal quotation marks omitted).10 
Nor is the outcome here governed by Illinois Brick.  
Unlike Illinois and the other municipal purchasers of 
completed masonry structures and buildings from non-
conspirators, who had only a highly attenuated relationship 
with the concrete manufacturer conspirators, Plaintiffs are in a 
direct purchaser relationship with the conspirator Defendants.  
Plaintiffs simply are not seeking to press an indirect purchaser 
antitrust claim: the egg products are alleged to be price-fixed, 
as the principal component of the egg products – shell eggs – 
is alleged to be price-fixed, regardless of whether those shell 
eggs are internal eggs or non-conspirator eggs.  Moreover, 
unlike in Illinois Brick, here there appears to be no “serious 
risk of multiple liability” – Defendants can be sued by, and 
likely only by, direct purchasers, such as Plaintiffs – and the 
issues of proof and apportionment of damages are not of a 
magnitude that imposes intolerable “costs to the judicial 
system and the efficient enforcement of the antitrust laws.”  
Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 730-32. 
                                                 
10 Additionally, our holding in Mid-West Paper reflected 
reluctance to “expand the standing doctrine” in cases where 
complex economic analyses “are a prerequisite to establishing 
that the plaintiff has suffered compensable injury altogether.”  
596 F.2d at 585.  That problem is not presented here.  To the 
contrary, as noted above, the question of whether the 
Purchasers suffered any actionable harm is clearly resolved in 
their favor under Stotter. 
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Application of the AGC factors confirms the conclusion 
that Plaintiffs have antitrust standing to pursue their full claim.  
See generally 459 U.S. at 537-38; see also Ethypharm, 707 
F.3d at 232-33.  Plaintiffs allege a clear “causal connection 
between the antitrust violation and the harm to [them] and the 
intent by the defendant[s] to cause that harm.”  That is, 
Plaintiffs contend that Defendants drove up the price of shell 
eggs intending to likewise artificially inflate the price of egg 
products and then injured Plaintiffs by making them pay 
overcharges to Defendants.  Further, Plaintiffs’ “alleged 
injury” – that is, being made to pay higher prices – “is of the 
type for which the antitrust laws were intended to provide 
redress,” and the injury allegedly flowed “direct[ly]” from 
Defendants to Plaintiffs.  See generally In re Modafinil, 837 
F.3d at 263 (“[D]irectness of injury is the focal point by which 
the remainder of the AGC factors are guided.”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Also, there are no “more direct 
victims of the alleged antitrust violations,” no “potential for 
duplicative recovery,” and no “complex apportionment of 
damages” issues among various levels of injured parties.  Our 
recognition here that direct purchasers, like Plaintiffs, have 
antitrust standing to sue conspirators, like Defendants, from 
whom they purchased a price-fixed product, does not make 
Defendants vulnerable to suit from downstream consumers – 
for instance, a purchaser of waffles made by Plaintiffs with 
Defendants’ egg products – with whom Defendants have no 
relationship.  To the contrary, if Plaintiffs cannot sue for the 
overcharges incorporated in the egg products they purchased, 
no one else can sue Defendants for these losses. 
The Purchasers’ antitrust standing does not turn on 
whether it is the Suppliers, as opposed to someone else, who 
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benefitted from the overcharges the Purchasers paid.  Damages 
recoverable by a plaintiff on a § 4 claim do not depend on the 
ill-gotten benefit of the wrongdoer.  See Howard Hess Dental 
Labs. Inc. v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 424 F.3d 363, 374 (3d Cir. 
2005).  Instead, the “typical measure” of damages on such a 
claim is the overcharge paid by the plaintiff, that is “the 
difference between the actual price and the presumed 
competitive price multiplied by the quantity purchased.”  Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Regardless of who actually 
collected the overcharge, the Purchasers’ econometric analysis 
purports to show the “difference between the actual 
[supracompetitive] price and the presumed competitive price” 
of the egg products they purchased.  This purported difference, 
and the Purchasers’ resulting injury, was allegedly a direct and 
intended result of the Suppliers’ conspiracy to reduce the 
supply of eggs and to artificially inflate the price of egg 
products. 
In sum, we conclude that Plaintiffs-Appellants have 
antitrust standing to pursue overcharge damages from the 
Defendants-Appellees from whom they purchased egg 
products, regardless of whether those egg products were made 
with internal eggs, non-conspirator eggs, or both.  
Consequently, we reverse the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment to Defendants and remand for further 
proceedings. 
C 
We emphasize that our holding today is limited to 
determining that Plaintiffs have antitrust standing to pursue 
their claims.  We conclude that the District Court’s grant of 
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summary judgment due to lack of such standing was error.11  
We express no view as to the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims.  Nor 
have we reached any conclusion as to whether their claims may 
suffer from other flaws that may make this case amenable to 
resolution short of trial.  Hence, while Plaintiffs ask us to 
“remand the case for trial” (OB at 56), we have not done so.  
Instead, it will be for the District Court to determine whether, 
given our conclusion that Plaintiffs have antitrust standing, this 
case should proceed to trial. 
We recognized in Mid-West Paper that antitrust 
plaintiffs must prove “actual causation” with “reasonable 
certainty,” and provide the trier of fact enough to “make a 
reasonable estimate of damages.”  596 F.2d at 584 n.43 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  We reiterate these 
holdings.  Our decision today does not consider whether 
Plaintiffs have made, or can make, a sufficient evidentiary 
showing on these elements to warrant presenting their claims 
to a jury.  Similarly, it is for the District Court to decide 
whether to entertain any challenge to Plaintiffs’ expert’s 
econometric analysis under the familiar standard set out in 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 
                                                 
11 Defendants’ motion for summary judgment was based solely 
on their theory that Plaintiffs lack antitrust standing due to their 
reliance on an invalid umbrella theory of damages.  
Consequently, the District Court’s summary judgment opinion 
considered only that issue. 
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(1993),12 and whether to grant any request it may receive from 
any party to expand the record in light of today’s decision. 
VII 
 For the reasons given above, we find that Plaintiffs-
Appellants have antitrust standing to pursue their Clayton Act 
§ 4 claims.  The District Court’s grant of summary judgment 
to Defendants-Appellees is reversed.  The case is remanded for 
proceedings not inconsistent with this Opinion. 
                                                 
12 The District Court noted that “no party has challenged the 
admissibility of [Plaintiffs’] expert report or testimony.”  (JA5) 
